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WHAT MAKES A "LEADING" CASE  
Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson* 
The theme developed in the paper is that what makes a leading case is not immediately apparent or 
able to be captured in a short definition. The crucial questions are how and why a case is seen to be 
or to have been particularly influential in settling an area of the law. Exploring these questions 
necessarily involves viewing the case in its historical context. Economic and behavioural 
implications and impacts should also be kept in mind. 
The paper draws on empirical research involving retired judges, experienced lawyers and judges' 
clerks and on specialist essays by senior academic lawyers produced for the 50th anniversary 
conference of the Court of Appeal in 2008. The research results show how much room there is for 
differing assessments of significance. The second half of the paper discusses a range of appeal cases 
explaining how and why the Court focussed on particular matters of significance in deciding the 
cases  
I INTRODUCTION 
I started thinking seriously about the question, what makes a leading case, when working on the 
history of the Court of Appeal for the 50th anniversary conference of the Court, included along with 
specific subject-area essays in The Permanent New Zealand Court of Appeal: Essays on the First 50 
Years.1 
The question, why is a particular case significant, is also important in the research project for 
Recovering New Zealand's Lost Cases which is focussing on Supreme Court decisions from1841-
1883 and Native Land Court decisions from the first 20 years of that court. 
  
*  Distinguished Fellow, Law Faculty, Victoria University of Wellington. Judge of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal 1977 to 2002, President 1996-2002. 
1  Rick Bigwood (ed) The Permanent New Zealand Court of Appeal: Essays on the First 50 Years (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2009). 
318 (2010) 41 VUWLR 
II FIVE BACKGROUND POINTS 
A There is Value in Comparing Different Perspectives 
I start with five background points. First, cases do not arrive in the court system labelled 
"leading case". A case that may initially seem important may subsequently be regarded as of limited 
significance, except to the parties. What may initially escape notice may later be viewed as truly 
significant in illuminating the development of our laws and changes in New Zealand society.  
Answering the question, what are our leading cases, necessarily involves historical analysis, viewing 
the case, whenever decided, both in its historical context and its contemporary relevance.  
It follows that the identification of what makes a leading case is not the exclusive preserve of 
judges and lawyers (practising and academic). They have the expertise to provide crucial 
perspectives. But, the public policy impacts of judicial decisions are also the legitimate concerns of 
legislators, administrators, political scientists, sociologists, historians, philosophers, economists, 
educators and the news media. Some studies have been concerned with resource and behavioural 
implications of the functioning of the courts. Others have contained detailed analyses (including 
comparisons across jurisdictions) of structures of judgments, reasoning methods and citation 
practices. Whatever their special fields, their different perspectives can helpfully be compared and 
contrasted with those of judges and lawyers.  
And a wide view of what cases are significant is clearly important in the identification of "lost 
cases". The project team for Recovering New Zealand's Lost Cases emphasises the importance of 
assessing cases in their contemporary contexts, decade by decade. That involves searching through 
newspapers and other secondary sources to identify cases of potential importance and then 
classifying, processing and assessing their significance. 
B Research Projects have to be Linked to Particular Courts and Periods 
Second, to try to compile a list of all the leading cases decided by the New Zealand courts would 
be a mammoth undertaking. It would require a comprehensive database of all cases decided with 
reasoned decisions by all courts since 1840 and would have to cover hundreds of thousands of cases 
over a vast range of activities resolved through the adversarial processes. To be practical, any 
research project has to be linked to particular courts and periods. 
In round terms 14,000 reasoned decisions were given following hearing by the Court of Appeal 
over the 50 years. For the same period the case numbers in the High Court were many times those of 
the Court of Appeal and, overwhelming those totals, the District Court and its predecessors have 
always disposed of the vast bulk of cases decided in the court system, as reflected in the workload 
figures analysed in the voluminous Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts.2  
  
2  Report of the Royal Commission on the Courts [1978] AJHR H2. 
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The breakdown between civil and criminal is important. While as late as 1990 the civil decisions 
of the Court of Appeal (188) were fairly close in numbers to criminal decisions (208), in 2000 and 
2007 there were in round terms twice as many criminal decisions (301 as against 157 civil decisions 
in 2000 and 375 as against 197 in 2007).3 But there were sufficient civil decisions throughout the 50 
years to require those contributing and focussing on significant cases to be selective. 
C Formulating Lists of Significant Cases for History Essay 
Third, as part of the research for the history essay two small groups were asked to formulate 
their individual lists of significant cases decade by decade over the five decades:4 the nine judges' 
clerks at the Court in 2007 and, toward the other end of the time spectrum, 10 retired judges (nine 
former permanent members of the Court and Doogue J, a very experienced trial and Divisional 
Court judge) and two very experienced lawyers. The decade approach was to avoid any risk of over-
focus on recent years. I should add that I did not prepare an individual list because I did not want to 
be subconsciously influenced in writing up that section of the history. 
The brief to each of the nine clerks was to name from each decade no more than two or three 
cases they considered particularly significant for New Zealand and, for each case selected, to say 
why briefly (in no more than two sentences). The overlap figures were interesting. Only 10 of the 69 
in the combined lists were included in more than four individual lists with 47 of the 69 being 
included once or twice in the separate lists and a further eight in only three lists. 
The second group were given the combined lists of the clerks and invited to provide individual 
lists (not more than two or three in each decade, and without feeling the need to identify cases from 
each decade), and for each case to say why (again briefly). Only eight of the 71 in the combined lists 
were included in more than four individual lists with a further five of the 71 included in four 
individual lists.  
Interestingly, only 29 cases were common to both lists and of the 10 included in more than four 
clerks' lists only five were present in more than four of the judges' and lawyers' lists. Widening the 
comparison base to four or more adds just three more cases. One clerk commented that her law 
school education drew her attention to relatively few early Court of Appeal cases and gave a much 
greater sense of recent cases, probably out of proportion in an historical context. 
The full combined lists are at Appendix E: 4 of the history,5 which also shows the number of 
times each case appeared in more than one individual list. The diverse responses both within and 
between the two groups show that identifying leading cases is not straightforward. Accordingly, the 
  
3  Sir Ivor Richardson "The Permanent Court of Appeal: Surveying the 50 Years" in Bigwood, above n 1, 297 
at Appendix A [the "history essay"]. 
4  Ibid, at Appendix E. 
5  Ibid, at 367-369. 
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history chapter noted that the material provided warranted an extensive stand-alone research study 
to analyse and draw conclusions from all cases selected and the reasons for their selection.6 
D Cases identified in subject-area essays 
Fourth and turning to the subject-area cases, that passage went on to note that such a study could 
also explore some striking differences between the two lists and the cases identified in the subject-
area analyses comprising the other chapters in the book. It was recognised that the one day 50th 
anniversary conference could not be expected to be comprehensive. In the event it was confined to 
eight specific subject-areas with their specialist contributors: 
 Professor Jim Evans: who was asked to focus on "Precedent in New Zealand's Permanent 
Court of Appeal"; 
 Professor Philip Joseph: "The Contribution of the Court of Appeal to Commonwealth 
Administrative Law"; 
 Professor ATH Smith: "Fifty Years of Criminal Appeals in the Permanent Court of 
Appeal", which, for reasons he gave, excluded substantive criminal law; 
 Professors Mark Henaghan and Nicola Peart: "Relationship Property Appeals in the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal 1958-2008: The Elusiveness of Equality"; 
 Professor Stephen Todd: "The Court of Appeal, Accident Compensation and Tort 
Litigation"; 
 Professor Peter Watts: "Company law and the Court of Appeal 1958-2008"; 
 Dr JK Maxton: "Equity in Commercial Dealings"; 
 Associate Professor RP Boast: "The Court of Appeal and Indigenous Rights: From Ninety-
Mile Beach to Ngati Apa". 
The specialist essays discussed around 150 Court of Appeal decisions and cited several hundred 
more. The combined total of "significant" cases identified in the two lists in the history essays7 and 
the some 150 discussed in the specialist essays (without any reduction for some of the overlapping 
in those sub-totals) is only a tiny fraction of the 14,000 reasoned decisions of the Court over the 50 
years. A comprehensive study would have required an army of specialist commentators with 
different contributors on each topic providing different perspectives. Clearly, too, the particular 
focus of each of the specific subject-area papers inevitably meant that there were still large gaps in 
the coverage of the work of the Court.  
For example, revenue law (involving appeals in taxes and duties with substantive law and 
process questions including major judicial review cases) of which there were some 120 reported 
decisions by the Court and over 30 in the Privy Council, had only some 10 case citations in the 
  
6  Ibid, at 313. 
7  Ibid, at 68 and 71. 
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subject area chapters and in the two lists in the history chapter. Perhaps equally if not more striking 
was the absence of any focus on employment, regulating commerce, legislative interpretation – 
particularly given the increasing prominence of New Zealand statute law and the corresponding 
decline of judge-made common law,8 constitutional law and human rights. 
Again, and because that was not part of their focus, the clerks and the judges and lawyers lists 
did not bring out the uneasy relationship at times between the Court of Appeal jurisprudence and the 
values of the Privy Council judges in various economic, social and national identity areas, where the 
Privy Council "might", but at other times did not, emphasise the importance of local conditions.9 
Interestingly, some of the specific subject-area essays did so, notably Professor Evans on Precedent, 
where he carefully traversed the slow and deliberate steps in which the Court grappled with the 
questions of when and applying what tests it would depart from its own decisions.10 Professor 
Evans explained how consensus eventually coalesced after more than a decade around a passage 
from one of the judgments in the early decision in Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co 
Ltd,11 and went on to consider how that approach had been worked out in later cases. And some 
other subject-area essays debated the respective stances of the Court and the Privy Council in some 
decisions, for example Professor Watts, Dr Maxton and Professor Todd when discussing the handful 
of exemplary damages decisions.12 
E Lord Cooke's Assessment in the 1996 Hamlyn Lectures 
Fifth, the Hamlyn Lectures of 1996 provide another perspective of significant cases by a New 
Zealander steeped in the law. Lord Cooke's series titled Turning Points of the Common Law 
focussed on some themes in company law, crime, tort and public law and discussed relevant cases 
from various jurisdictions.13 Thirty of the 146 cases listed in the Table of Cases were from New 
Zealand but 10 were either outside the 1958–2007 period of the Court of Appeal conference or were 
High Court decisions. The lectures were not directed to either family law or precedent cases and the 
seven substantive criminal law cases and six tort cases discussed by Lord Cooke were not from 
areas covered in the subject-area chapters at the conference. However, and perhaps surprisingly, 
only 10 of the 20 cases from the period discussed by Lord Cooke were included in either (or both) 
of the Clerks and the Judges and Lawyers' lists. 
  
8  Ibid, at 310. 
9  Ibid, at 319-325. 
10  Jim Evans "Precedent in New Zealand Permanent Court of Appeal" in Bigwood, above n 1, at 1-40. 
11  Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 404 at 414-415 (CA). 
12  Stephen Todd "The Court of Appeal, Accident Compensation and tort litigation" in Bigwood above n 1 151, 
at 197-201. 
13  Lord Cooke of Thorndon Turning Points of the Common Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997). 
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III WHAT MAKES A LEADING CASE: COMPARING SOME 
LEGAL SCHOLARLY WORKS  
Following on from that long lead in I turn now to discuss what makes a leading case. I started by 
searching Google for web references to "leading cases" plus "law". The answer was "about 230,000" 
with advice to narrow the search. So I tried "what is a leading case" plus "law". That yielded only 
three references, two to American encyclopaedias and the third to what I found was a light-hearted 
account at the retirement function for a Queensland Magistrate in 2008.  
I found it more helpful to consult and compare some legal scholarly works in a Wellington 
library. I mention only three. First, Professor David M Walker in his The Oxford Companion to Law 
(1980) states:14 
A judicial decision is always regarded as the chief precedent or judicial statement of principle on a 
particular point. Such cases are always referred to in relevant textbooks and later cases, and various 
collections of leading cases have been published, notably JW Smith's Leading Cases in various branches 
of the Law (1837 and many later editions) and FT White & OD Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity (1849 
and later editions), which collect the leading cases on particular points and show by annotations how the 
principles stated in the leading cases have been applied in later cases. 
Next, Butterworths New Zealand Law Dictionary pithily defines the term: "A case which has 
had the most influence in settling an area of the law."15 It is "leading" because it becomes 
recognised as an authoritative statement of the governing principle. 
Finally, the Editor's Preface in New Zealand Law Reports Leading Cases,16 covering the period 
from 1840 to 1958, emphasises the role of the New Zealand Law Reports as a filtering and research 
tool and as making available to lawyers the leading precedents from the period (the compilation 
totalling around 100 cases). 
In his Clarendon Press study, Leading Cases in the Common Law, Professor Brian Simpson 
points out that:17  
... it is no more than common sense to appreciate that it is misguided, if other relevant materials exist, to 
rely upon law reports alone to tell us what happened in the case, how the dispute arose, what the persons 
involved conceived the dispute to be about, how it came to be litigated, how it came to be decided the 
way it was, much less what the consequences were to the people or to others indirectly affected by the 
decision. 
  
14  David M Walker Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980). 
15  Peter Spiller Butterworths New Zealand Law Dictionary (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington 2005) at 168. 
16  Bernard Robertson (ed) New Zealand Law Reports Leading Cases (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005). 
17  AW Brian Simpson Leading Cases in the Common Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) at 11. 
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And, so, as he asks in the Preface with respect to the cases he studied:18 
Was Shelley's Case (1581) really a product of the doctrines of property law, or was it perhaps a political 
decision? Is it possible to tell? How does an antique quarrel about the capture of wild ducks, Keeble v 
Hickeringill (1707), retain an educational and doctrinal significance nearly three centuries later? Was 
the very absurdity of Jee v. Audley (1787) perhaps its guarantee of immortality? Whatever happened 
about accidents at work before Priestley v. Fowler (1837), and what induced the victim's father in that 
case to take the unprecedented step of suing his employer for damages in tort law? Why did the case of 
Raffles v Wichelhaus and Busch (1864) ever come to court, and why did a case which includes no 
judicial opinion whatsoever become a focus of academic interest, principally fuelled by ignorance? 
What light does a historical analysis of Tipping v St Helen's Smelting Company (1865) throw upon 
economic theories as to how nuisance cases arising out of conflicting land uses ought to be decided?  
Was the decision in Rylands v Fletcher (1868) really about Mr Rylands' unprepossessing and still 
defective reservoir? What has the case of R v. Keyn (1876) to tell us about the value and the possibility 
of the ideal of the rule of law? What is the relationship between quack medicine, Carlill v. Carbolic 
Smoke Ball Company (1893), and the dogmatics of contract law?  
IV LAW LIBRARIES AND THE INTERNET ARE RESEARCH 
LABORATORIES   
Law libraries and the Internet provide access to a constantly expanding base of decided cases 
along with associated texts and other commentaries. The libraries and the internet are the raw 
material for the argument and resolution of legal issues in reasoned decisions in usually adversarial 
proceedings. They are the research laboratories for scholars, judges, lawyers (practising and 
academic) and students, as well as the working base for those immediately involved in the argument 
and resolution of particular cases. The usability of the material obviously depends on how well the 
input is selected, collected, constantly updated, classified, digested and indexed. 
All courts have associated libraries. Their libraries and those of law schools, law reform and 
public sector advisory bodies, law firms and legal chambers often have a substantial range of 
associated sociological, economic, political science and historical materials. As one international 
statesman remarked, harking back to his student days:19  
What was remarkable about our law faculty? First of all, it provided a comprehensive and wide-ranging 
curriculum. … The underlying premise was that mastering purely juridical subjects required a 
fundamental knowledge of modern socio-economic and political processes, and, therefore had to be part 
of a comprehensive curriculum which included all the social sciences. 
  
18  Ibid, at vii. 
19  M Gorbachev Memoirs (Doubleday, New York, 1996) at 53. 
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Similar comments could be made about the integration of sociological, economic, political and 
historical material into the teaching at our law schools. And New Zealand law collections follow the 
same patterns with general series and specialist subject-area reports and commentaries from New 
Zealand and a range of overseas jurisdictions and international law materials available directly and 
through computer based research. 
V LAWYERS KNOW THAT RESOLVING LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
REQUIRES CONSIDERATION OF HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS AND BEHAVIOURAL IMPLICATIONS 
At first impression it may seem strange to many historians, and perhaps to some attending this 
conference, that neither "history" nor "legal history" is a separate chapter in the multi-volume The 
Laws of New Zealand and neither is listed in the detailed index. But, as all lawyers know, 
consideration of historical developments is basic to any legal argument and its resolution, and so is 
awareness of economic and behavioural implications and impacts.  Professor Richard Boast's recent 
paper, "New Zealand legal history and 'mainstream' New Zealand history: a non-meeting of minds", 
should help dispel some myths.20 
It is, of course, very helpful in setting the stage to have the identification and discussion of 
particular cases in the subject-area essays even though the contributing specialists were not asked 
specifically to answer the more general question about what makes a leading case. As earlier noted, 
the results of their combined endeavours yielded significantly different lists from those contained in 
the lists in the history essay. That may point to the desirability of bringing together a set of criteria 
against which to assess whether or not a decision can be considered a leading case. Even so, the 
cases listed in the history essay and the comments of those contributors bring out the real room for 
differing judgments at the end of the day. 
As the history essay also noted,21 it may be worthwhile to reclassify cases identified in analyses 
overall and by decade by broad subject-area, for example, contract and commercial law, tort, equity, 
crime, public law – and, I suggest, to divide each into its sub-areas, and in that way build up a more 
extensive template. 
A Insights from those Contributing to the History Essay and Reflections 
on Some Cases they Listed 
One former judge commented that the number of times a case is subsequently cited does not 
measure its comparative importance. Some subjects may attract more litigation and social, economic 
  
20  Richard Boast "New Zealand Legal History and 'Mainstream' New Zealand History: a Non-meeting of 
Minds" (paper presented to The Antipodes: New Directions in History and Culture Aotearoa New Zealand 
conference, Wellington, September 2009) (Publication forthcoming.). 
21  Richardson, above n 3, at 313. 
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and political factors change over time and may affect the balance. The judge also observed that a 
case might be a "one off'" but nevertheless be of great constitutional or other importance. Another 
judge noted that his choices were influenced by how important a decision was in the day-to-day 
work of the courts, whether a decision was part of the development of a distinctively New Zealand 
jurisprudence, whether a decision had stood the test of time unscathed, or whether for some other 
reason a decision seemed of particular significance. 
Taking a somewhat different perspective, another judge, in assessing significance, had regard to 
institutional and process issues as well as to substantive ones and also mentioned particular new 
statutes for each decade along with the cases as helping to provide some context. Again, the 
increasing impact in our legislation of New Zealand's international treaty obligations (and 
particularly the ascendancy of human rights laws often generally expressed and employing loosely 
textured language) and international conventions governing flows of goods, services and funds 
(including allocation of taxes) in an increasingly global world also affect decision making. 
Where difficult problems arise there may well be differing views as to whether the Court should 
respond to a new situation as a common law development or leave it to the legislature to deal with 
it. For example, the Court divided in R v Hughes over the contention that an undercover police 
officer need not disclose his identity to the defence.22 The majority concluded that under traditional 
common law principles the witness must give his true name and occupation if asked by the defence. 
The minority took the view that the request could be refused by a trial judge and listed series of 
principles to govern the exercise of the judge's discretion. Parliament promptly legislated to allow 
undercover officers to give evidence. But, as noted in the next Court of Appeal decision of R v 
Hines (where the witness seeking anonymity was not an undercover officer but feared intimidation 
if obliged to disclose his true identity), when Parliament legislated in the wake of Hughes it adopted 
a much narrower approach than suggested by the minority judges in Hughes.23  
The judgment in Hines had earlier discussed at some length major practical problems for the 
Courts in deciding public policy litigation, noting that court processes do not allow public policy to 
be developed in the systematic way that is regarded as desirable elsewhere in government.24 The 
passage contrasted the limited processes by which courts can obtain relevant information and then 
assess it, with the manner in which the Law Commission works by engaging in extensive research 
and analysis including gathering relevant facts, publishing discussion papers, evaluating responses, 
and then presenting final reports with draft Bills attached – which are then further subjected, as 
appropriate, to the general governmental and parliamentary legislative policy processes.  In that 
regard, reflect, too, on Senator Fulbright's conclusion "You can't change society too much through 
  
22  R v Hughes [1996] 2 NZLR 129 (CA) 
23  R v Hines [1997] 3 NZLR 529 at 543 (CA) 
24  Ibid at 539-54 
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the courts. Most of it has to come through the political system. Even if it takes longer, it's more 
likely to stick."25   
The history essay noted that a citation study could be helpful in assessing the relative 
significance of cases in their historical setting.26 Various considerations were noted including the 
significant reduction in the citation of older cases (from 43 per cent in 1960 less than 10 years' old to 
around 70 per cent by 1970 and on to 2007). Presumably, the essay observed, that reflects the 
influence of a host of factors, such as the rate of social change, increasing changes to the statute 
base and the increasing dominance generally of statute law and correspondingly lesser influence of 
the common law – and perhaps because older cases have not been entered into electronic databases 
relied on so much for legal research.27 
I noted earlier the comment of one of the clerks that her law school education drew her attention 
to relatively few early Court of Appeal cases and suggested in the history essay that it could be 
worthwhile exploring whether there is any correlation between the selection of cases and the law 
schools attended by the clerks, the subjects taken and their teachers there. Another question, 
occasionally posed, is whether judicial attitudes are significantly affected by influential early 
teachers. 
Overall, too, the judges and lawyers selected more cases from the middle decades and, though 
given the clerks' lists as a lead in, they clearly made their individual assessments, as the low overlap 
between the two lists demonstrates. 
Comments in the history essay about three of the most ranked cases are also relevant to how 
those involved saw those cases.28 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General29 was overall the 
highest ranked case in the two lists. The decision was and continues to be of great significance, even 
though the legal answer required the orthodox application of well-settled principles governing 
judicial review of the exercise of statutory powers of decision by ministers and of the interpretation 
of the state-owned enterprises legislation in its statutory background. What the Court had to do was 
to provide both a factual base, including indicating some of the complexities surrounding the Treaty 
of Waitangi, sufficient to explain the legal answer, and give some guidance for those concerned with 
the tide of cases that were expected to follow (and did so) under the legislation. 
  
25  Quoted in Bill Clinton My Life (Knopf, New York, 2004) at 127.  
26  Richardson, above n 3, at 314. 
27  Ibid, at 311. 
28  Ibid, at 316. 
29  New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (CA). 
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Invercargill City Council v Hamlin determined major legal issues of great practical significance 
concerning the liability of local authorities to home owners for the carelessness of their building 
inspectors.30 Several clerks saw added significance in the emphasis given to developing New 
Zealand law to meet local conditions and in the hands-off response by the Privy Council on the 
further appeal. 
Hosking v Runting was a major privacy case concerning photographing families of celebrities 
out in the street.31 The comment in the text was that the different perceptions of the case by the 
clerks (in eight out of nine lists) and the judges and lawyers (only two out of 12) may suggest that 
for some in the latter group the amorphousness of the principle of the case meant it was too early to 
tell how significant it will be. 
Finally, one Judge, thinking as he said more on broader lines of trends or developments, saw the 
most important development in the first decade as the beginning of the establishment of a New 
Zealand legal identity. In the second, he gave primacy to the development of matrimonial law, in the 
third to the two streams of administrative law and Waitangi issues, and in the fourth to the Bill of 
Rights cases, with no special trend discerned in the last decade, 1998 to 2007. 
B A Broad View of Significant Cases    
A few moments ago I noted that the legal answer in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney 
General required the orthodox application of well-settled legal principles. The Judges from that case 
who spoke at the well-attended and lively symposium marking the 20th anniversary of the case 
emphasised that point.32 After a flood of comments questioning that view, one of the Judges said: 
"Well, all I can say is – read the judgments." I suggest that that interchange shows how the legal 
issues themselves had become invested with a much wider significance, essentially because of the 
impact of the case on Maori-Government relations and ultimately on the political history of New 
Zealand.  
Keeping in mind Professor Simpson's questioning approach to the cases he studied,33 I will 
discuss a number of cases in my own experience and suggest various strands of significance in the 
reasoning of the judges. The particular focus of the first case is on language – determining the 
meaning of words in their context; the second is on administrative functioning – settling limits to the 
exercise of governmental power and facilitating effective administration; the third is on economic 
implications of decision-making; the fourth is on statutory interpretation – reflecting the historical 
  
30 Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513 (CA). 
31  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
32  Jacinta Ruru (ed) In Good Faith: Symposium Proceedings Marking the 20th Anniversary of the Lands Case 
(New Zealand Law Foundation, Wellington, 2008). 
33  Simpson, above n 17, at 6-7. 
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development of the statutory subject matter and the policies underlying related categories; the fifth 
is on the development of the common law of New Zealand – reflecting local conditions; and the 
sixth is on the duty of care in negligence – where the Court rejected claims against the Securities 
Commission and two newspapers in respect of failed investments in a finance company made as a 
result of reading its newspaper advertisements. 
1 King-Ansell v Police 
King-Ansell v Police was an extraordinary case.34 The appellant had been convicted under the 
Race Relations Act 1971 of publishing a pamphlet with intent to incite ill-will against a group of 
persons "on the ground of their ethnic origins." The major issue was whether Jewish people in New 
Zealand formed a group with common ethnic origins. The Court of Appeal was unanimous that they 
did. The meaning to be given to particular words in their different contexts is basic to all statutory 
interpretation. In any living language usages may change. An historical meaning may cease to be in 
current use. New usages may develop.  
I suggest that the judgments in the case were significant for three reasons. The first was that the 
arguments advanced by counsel led to extended discussions of a range of English, American and 
New Zealand dictionaries. In that regard counsel for the appellant had contended that "ethnic" was 
to be confined to its ancient meaning applying to Gentiles, thus excluding Jews and Christians, and 
that certain later expanded meanings were to be disregarded as an American aberration. For my part 
I considered it helpful to cover in some detail, and by reference to the Oxford English Dictionary 
and its Supplements, the careful processes for recording actual usages that were followed in 
compiling dictionaries and attributing particular meanings to words as used in their different 
contexts.  
The second was that the Race Relations Act 1971 explicitly implemented the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.35  In my judgment I also 
concluded that an expression in English in an international Convention must have been intended by 
the framers to have essentially the same meaning in all English speaking countries implementing the 
English language text of the Convention and that our Acts Interpretation Act provisions allowed 
regard to be had to the international English usage of those expressions in the Convention.36 
The third was that a sociologist with qualifications also in anthropology gave evidence 
concerning the modern connotations of the word "ethnic".  There we felt that his conclusions had to 
be modified to accord with the Race Relations Act approach. 
  
34  King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531 (CA). 
35  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (opened for signature 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969).  
36  King-Ansell v Police, above n 33, at 540-541. 
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My ultimate conclusion was that:37 
… a group is identifiable in terms of its ethnic origins if it is a segment of the population distinguished 
from others by a sufficient combination of shared customs, beliefs, traditions and characteristics derived 
from a common or presumed common past, even if not drawn from what in biological terms is a 
common racial stock. It is that combination which gives them an historically determined social identity 
in their own eyes and in the eyes of those outside the group. They have a distinct social identity based 
not simply on group cohesion and solidarity but also on their belief as to their historical antecedents.  
2 Van Gorkom v Attorney-General 
Van Gorkom v Attorney-General concerned the entitlement of a married woman teacher to 
removal expenses when transferring on promotion from one teaching position to another.38 
Mrs Van Gorkom transferred from New Plymouth to Wellington. Her husband was in full-time 
employment outside the teaching profession. 
A teacher's entitlement to removal expenses was governed by general conditions made by the 
Minister of Education under the Education (Salaries and Staffing) Regulations 1957. The removal 
expenses regime treated men and women differently. A married man living with his wife was 
entitled to all the expenses listed for moving the household. Paragraph C28.3.3 applied to a married 
woman teacher living with her husband who was not fully dependent on her. In that case she 
received personal expenses. Then, paragraph C28.3.4 provided that, where the married woman 
teacher was supporting a husband who was an invalid and dependent on her financially, payment of 
removal expenses as for a married man would be considered.  
Regulation 16(2) applied only where the teacher was transferred on promotion. It was in the 
teacher's interests and in the wider interests of the education service, based as it was on progression 
through a career structure, that the teacher should do so. And so, whether the teacher was male or 
female, actual and reasonable expenses of removal to take up that position were to be borne by the 
Crown. The Court concluded that the Minister acted unreasonably in the administrative law sense 
and departed from the scheme of the regulations in approving paragraphs C28.3.3 and 28.3.4. On 
that answer counsel for both parties were agreed that the detailed provisions of the general 
conditions were to be applied to married women teachers as they were to men. 
  
37  King-Ansell, above n 33. See also Mandla (Sewa Singh) v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548; R(E) v Governing 
Body of JFS (United Synagogue  intervening) [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 WLR 153 at [185]-[186] per Lord 
Hope DP; Reid Mortensen, "Rendering to God and Caesar: Religion in Australian Discrimination Law" 
(1994-1995) 18 UQLJ 208 at 216-217; and Loretta de Plevitz and Larry Croft, "Aboriginality under the 
Microscope: The Biological Descent Test in Australian Law" (2003) 3 QUTLJJ 104 at 117-120. 
38  Van Gorkom v Attorney-General [1978] 2 NZLR 387 (CA). 
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That agreement avoided the need for an inquiry as to whether, in fact, the family of the teacher 
moved because of the teacher's appointment. We were conscious of the advantage of avoiding a 
factual inquiry in every case and went on to say:39 
We have no doubt that, in laying down general conditions pursuant to subcl (9), the Minister would be 
entitled to conclude that, in most cases where both spouses are employed, the wife's employment is 
considered by both spouses to be subordinate to the husband's career. It hardly needs to be said, too, that 
the Minister is entitled to consider it appropriate for reasons of administrative convenience to establish a 
rule that would cover the generality of cases so long as he does not purport to take away any rights 
conferred by the regulations … 
It does not follow that the Minister is not entitled to differentiate in that respect between married male 
teachers and married female teachers. It would not be unreasonable for him to say that in today's society 
many women transferring in their employment, even on promotion, do so, at least primarily, because of 
and in the wake of the husband's career move. In many cases the expenses of shifting the household may 
fairly be characterised as expenses of his move rather than of her removal to take up her new post. In 
other cases the proper inference may be that the family would not have shifted unless both teacher wife 
and non-teacher husband wished to change their employments and that, as between themselves, it would 
be reasonable for each to contribute a proportion of the total costs of the family's move. 
Needless to say, social changes over the last 30 years would bar that administrative approach! 
3 DHL International (NZ) Ltd v Richmond Ltd 
DHL International (NZ) Ltd v Richmond Ltd turned on its economic implications.40 Richmond 
engaged DHL to convey a package to Italy without disclosing that it contained a bearer bill of 
lading. Richmond indicated on the package containing the bill of lading that the package's contents 
had no commercial value and they did not obtain insurance. The bill of lading enabled the thief who 
stole it to obtain valuable goods in Italy. The holder of the bill went bankrupt, and the goods were 
not recoverable. Richmond sued DHL for the value of the goods. The standard form of contract 
contained a clause that excluded all liability "in any event" for consequential or special damages or 
other indirect loss "however arising" and imposed strict time limits on claims against DHL. The 
High Court, as many courts had tended to do, refused to give effect to the exclusion clause. The 
standard approach had been to treat such clauses with suspicion on account of assumed inequality of 
bargaining power and imperfect information. 
We reversed the High Court's decision. As the exclusion was clearly worded, we felt that there 
was no justification for refusing to give it effect. Commercial parties know that the protection the 
contract provides is factored into the price – you get what you pay for. Commercial parties should 
  
39  Ibid, at 392-393. 
40  DHL International (NZ) Ltd v Richmond Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 10 (CA). 
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be aware of business risks and know that they can obtain insurance to protect against them. If they 
enter into a low-priced courier contract ($22.50 in the DHL case) that excludes liability on the part 
of the courier, then they are electing to bear any resulting losses. In return, they will have paid a 
lower price. The exclusion of liability will thus have been beneficial to both parties at the time of the 
contract. If, after entry into the contract and after losses have been suffered, courts refuse to enforce 
exclusion clauses, then they will be inhibiting mutually beneficial bargains. No one will be able to 
enter into a contract and negotiate a lower price relying in return on an exclusion of liability for 
consequential damages. 
That reasoning may not apply in consumer cases. Consumers may not be expected to understand 
the effect of an exclusion clause. But DHL was not such a case. And consumers, and society and the 
courts, need not always view standard term contracts with deep suspicion. Such contracts may 
provide huge savings in transaction costs. No one taking a bus would expect to spend the first few 
minutes haggling over the fare. "Take it or leave it" promotes costs savings. Courts need to be alive 
to the economic implications of their, usually retrospective, rulings.  
4 Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue41 raised various arguments in relation to the taxing 
of professional partnership income. The only one I want to discuss today is whether, like employees, 
those self-employed are to be taxed on income earned from their personal exertion.  
The taxpayer partner in a chartered accountancy firm had entered into legal arrangements 
designed to pass over to his family trust a share in his interests in the partnership and so in the 
profits of the partnership. The inquiry involved consideration of the historical development of the 
legislation and the scheme of various features. For much of its history the tax legislation had drawn 
a clear distinction between "earned" and "unearned" income. That distinction was important when 
differential rates applied to different categories and in the grant of some exemptions. In broad terms 
the distinction was between income from personal exertion and income from property. In relation to 
employment income the whole PAYE structure proceeded on the premise that income of that kind 
was derived by the employee concerned. The assumption was and is that the person whose personal 
exertion earns the income under the contract of employment derives that income and pays the tax.  
We concluded that, in policy terms, the same general considerations apply to the taxation of the 
earnings of the self-employed from their personal exertion. It was recognised that in some cases 
capital assets may play some part in the derivation of income and in some circumstances it may be 
necessary to analyse the particular income-earnings in some detail. But there is no justification in 
principle for differentiating between salary and wage earners and professionals whose income is the 
  
41  Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1991] 3 NZLR 517 (CA). See also Hadlee v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [1993] 2 NZLR 385 (PC). 
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product of their personal exertion. In either case the person whose personal exertion earns the 
income derives the income. 
5 Re Simpson 
Re Simpson decided who was entitled to estate property in circumstances where there was 
uncertainty surrounding the deceased owner's parentage.42 
Mrs Simpson had no children or siblings and her husband predeceased her. The question was 
whether she was the natural or adopted child of Mr and Mrs Wood, the persons she believed to have 
been her parents. If so, the property would be held on statutory trusts under the Administration Act 
1969 for the qualifying family members. If not, it devolved to the Crown as bona vacantia but the 
Crown was empowered by s 77(1)(e) "to provide for dependants, whether kindred or not, of the 
intestate, and other persons for whom the intestate might reasonably have been expected to make 
provision. 
Resolution of her parentage involved consideration of (1) the Births and Deaths Registration Act 
1951 and its predecessors, including the receipt, consideration and recording of relevant data; (2) the 
adoption legislation at the relevant time and the earlier history of adoptions going back to the 
passage in New Zealand of the Adoption of Children Act 1881, the first adoption legislation in the 
British Empire, the principal purpose of which was to give the adoptive parents legal protection and 
security lacking under existing law and thereby to encourage the practice of adoption; 43 (3) the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence of genealogy at common law in pedigree cases; and (4) 
assessment of considerable factual material. 
The case required extended consideration of the legislation in its historical and social setting. As 
noted above, consideration of historical developments is basic to any legal argument. And so it is 
where the argument concerns the development of the common law, here the common law of New 
Zealand. In deciding that question for New Zealand law, and instead of simply focussing on the 
ancient stance of the common law of England and its development, we considered it helpful to 
canvass American, Canadian and Scottish material as well as English decisions and texts. 
The Court concluded:44  
There are no decisions of this Court in this area and we consider that it is in the public interest that at 
common law the Courts of New Zealand should not be required to insist on the independent proof of a 
strict blood relationship. Hearsay evidence is admitted in pedigree cases because there would otherwise 
be a failure of justice in those inevitable situations where it is not possible to prove by living witnesses 
  
42  Re Simpson [1984] 1 NZLR 738 (CA). 
43  See (1881) 39 NZPD 4. 
44  Re Simpson, above n 42, at 725. 
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the relationships of past generations. Gone are the days, if they ever existed in New Zealand, when it 
could be said that any relative has a greater interest in seeking information on the subject, a better 
opportunity for obtaining it and less reason for falsifying it. In some cases the degree of intimacy and 
confidence subsisting between the declarant and the person in question may be far closer than between 
some relatives in our mobile society. We favour adopting the Wigmore test [the most authoritative 
multi-volume American text on Evidence] as best calculated to advance the interests of justice in this 
country. 
Applying that test to the facts of the case and reflecting the conclusions reached on the birth 
registration and adoption questions, we held that Mrs Simpson was not the natural child or adopted 
child of Mr and Mrs Wood. Her property devolved on the Crown. 
That is not the end of the story.  Dr G P Barton QC, who represented potential claimants in the 
High Court on the hypothesis, upheld by our ruling, that Mrs Simpson was neither the natural born 
nor the adopted child of Mr and Mrs Wood, has been able to confirm what then happened. The 
Crown was persuaded to apply s 77(1)(e) and pay the available funds to members of Mrs Simpson's 
family, as they were the persons for whom she might reasonably have been expected to make 
provision.  
6 Fleming v Securities Commission 
Fleming v Securities Commission involved claims in negligence law in respect of failed 
investments against the Securities Commission and two newspapers.45 The plaintiffs invested 
money in Star Investments as a result of reading advertisements in The Taranaki Herald and The 
Daily News. It was assumed that these advertisements breached various provisions of the Securities 
Act 1978 and the 1983 Regulations. The plaintiffs sought damages from the Securities Commission 
and the newspapers.  
We refused to impose a duty of care to individual investors on the Securities Commission. The 
Commission was charged with performing a wide range of both regulatory and law review and law 
reform functions while having a small staff and very limited budget. S 23(1) provided that no 
proceedings "shall lie against the Commission for anything it may do or fail to do in the course of 
the exercise … of its functions, unless it is shown that it acted in bad faith or without reasonable 
care." 
The statute clearly envisaged that the Commission exercised discretion in deciding how it went 
about exercising its functions. It was a supervisory agency with a limited role, not appropriate for 
the imposition of specific duties of care to all members of the investing public. The individual 
investors in this case could not be said to have placed such reliance on the Commission that they 
were in a relationship of proximity justifying such a duty. 
  
45  Fleming v Securities Commission [1995] 2 NZLR 514 (CA). 
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It was also argued that we should apply Anns v Merton London Borough Council46 and extend 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd47so as to impose liability on the newspapers. That 
would have had very serious consequences for the media and their readership. 
In my judgment I observed:48  
Advertisements are a feature of the mass media, print and electronic … They facilitate commerce in the 
area served … The volume of classified advertisements and the commercial need for them to appear in 
print within hours of their presentation for publication make it totally impracticable for a newspaper to 
investigate the factual accuracy of every advertisement, check compliance in all respects with legislation 
and the common law and verify authorisation for publication. … 
Essentially the newspaper is selling space for the advertisers to promote their goods and services. It is 
economically efficient for the responsibility for the accuracy, quality and legality of the advertising 
message to rest with the advertiser. The cost structure would have to change if the publisher had to 
accept or share that responsibility. … 
(F)inancial investments can never be risk free. And these advertisements were only a vehicle to allow 
potential investors to make contact with the finance company. The finance company had its statutory 
responsibility to register a prospectus and satisfy other requirements of the legislation. The investors had 
the opportunity to make inquiries about the investment and to assess the rewards and risks involved. The 
foreseeability of harm flowing from publication of non-complying advertisements is much diluted by the 
scope for immediate and fuller examination of the proposed investment before any commitment is made 
to it. … 
As a duty of care question, accuracy, reliability and lawfulness are all aspects of publication. The 
advertisement should be accurate, reliable and lawful. The advertiser may be liable civilly if it is not. To 
impose a duty of care on the media would open the door to liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. It could inhibit the free flow of information and change the 
cost structure of the media to the detriment of commerce and the wider public.  
In the result the economic consequences of imposing a duty were part of the standard Anns two-
stage analysis, along with foreseeability of harm, reasonableness of reliance and moral fault.   
7 Re Macfarlane  
Finally, and returning to the theme of the conference, Re Macfarlane is a striking example of the 
co-operative functioning of the three branches of government to resolve a seemingly intractable 
problem.  
  
46  Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. 
47  Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
48  Fleming v Securities Commission, above n 45, at 531-533. 
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The problem in Re Macfarlane and the steps taken to resolve it are explained in the John Donald 
Macfarlane Estate Administration Empowering Act 1918 and in the memoirs of OTJ Alpers, 
Canterbury schoolteacher, journalist, lawyer and Supreme Court Judge.49 His official role in the 
saga was as counsel for the Public Trustee who was representing Mr Macfarlane in the proceeding 
before the Supreme Court inquiring into a proposed Bill; and, after narrating the background and the 
steps he took as counsel, he went on to recount the unexpected aftermath.50 
Mr Macfarlane had a 20,000 acre sheep station, "Hawkswood". He had a wife and six adult 
children. Three of the four sons were absent from New Zealand on Active Military Service. 
Unfortunately he suffered mental illness. In 1896 he had been found on inquisition to be a lunatic 
and had been in a mental institution near Dunedin for some 16 years. Land tax on that huge station 
was a great burden and was upwards of 50 per cent of the farming income. There was much to be 
said in the public interest for closer settlement of the property. But it could not be done in his 
lifetime.  Or so it seemed. Until his lawyer had the idea of invoking the aid of Parliament. Before his 
mental trouble arose Mr Macfarlane had made a sensible will, which, if given effect, would provide 
his wife with a substantial annuity and enable division of the property amongst the family. The 
solicitors approached the government. A petition for a Private Estate Bill was filed. 
The inquiry into the proposed Bill was before Herdman J. He was a very experienced lawyer 
and politician and had been Attorney-General in the Massey and National Governments from 1912 
until his appointment to the Bench at Christchurch early in 1918. The psychiatric evidence was 
clear. There was no hope of recovery. The detailed provisions for the administration of the estate 
were settled. The Bill excluded from immediate distribution of the estate in terms of the will a sum 
to be set aside which would amply provide for Mr Macfarlane's maintenance and comfort, including 
a car and a chauffeur. It protected the life insurance companies by directing that his policies should 
not be payable until his actual death. The Judge certified under ss 281 and 282 of the Legislature 
Act 1908 his findings of fact, that the objects of the Bill were not attainable otherwise than by 
legislation and that the provisions of the Bill, if passed into law, would effect the proposed objects 
of the Bill. 
Herdman J's decision was delivered on 18 October 1918. The first reading of the Bill was on 31 
October. All Parliamentary processes, both in the Legislative Council and the House of 
Representative, including consideration by a special Select Committee, were completed within a 
month. The Bill was sent to the Committee for that body to examine it from all points of view and 
report back to the Legislative Council. The Committee did so, including calling the Inspector-
General who gave evidence that he had personally examined Mr Macfarlane. He was convinced 
there was no reasonable hope that Mr Macfarlane would ever again recover any testamentary 
  
49  OTJ Alpers Cheerful Yesterdays (John Murray, London, 1928) at 177-182. 
50  Ibid, at 181-182 
336 (2010) 41 VUWLR 
capacity. The Committee unanimously concluded that it was in the public interest as well as in the 
interests of the family that so large a block of land should no longer continue in single ownership.51 
The Bill was assented to and came into operation on 29 November. The statute empowered the 
Supreme Court to grant administration of the estate in terms of the will as if Mr Macfarlane had 
actually died on 29 November – the very day the Act had come into operation. All the children were 
deemed to have survived their father and to be living at that date and he was deemed to have been 
domiciled at "Hawkswood", enabling administration and distribution of his estate to be conducted 
through Christchurch rather than Dunedin. 
These steps were all completed in the midst of the pressures on the Executive and the 
Legislature surrounding the cessation of hostilities – Armistice Day was 11 November 1918 – and 
under the shadow of the devastating influenza epidemic which was sweeping the country. In 
processing the Bill so promptly and making the will immediately effective the legislators recognised 
the complications which would have arisen if any beneficiary died in the meantime. 
On 20 March 1919 the Supreme Court (Herdman J) granted Letters of Administration with the 
Will annexed to three sons of Mr Macfarlane. The family entered into their inheritance. The 
government received death duties well before it otherwise would. Everyone was happy. 
Then, confounding the medical experts, Mr Macfarlane recovered his sanity. He returned home. 
When the saga was explained to him he took it in his stride and lived there until nature completed 
the process which the State had begun. 
VI CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
First, what makes a leading case is not immediately apparent or able to be expressed in a short 
definition. The case has to have had the most influence in settling an area of the law. More 
important are the "how" and "why" questions. How and why is the case now seen to be or to have 
been particularly significant. And those questions are also important in the research project for 
recovering New Zealand's "Lost" Cases, which is the central focus of this conference. 
Exploring those questions necessarily involves historical analysis viewing the case in its 
historical context. Judges and lawyers (practising and academic) have the expertise to provide 
crucial perspectives. But the public policy impacts of court decisions are also the legitimate 
concerns of many others and the news media. And, as all lawyers know, consideration of historical 
developments is basic to any legal argument and its resolution, and so is awareness of economic and 
behavioural implications and impacts. Whether judges and lawyers are sufficiently open to other 
viewpoints is for others to assess. 
  
51  The Hansard references are 183 NZPD 118, 182, 362, 387, 415 and 455 where the House, recognising the 
need for the greatest possible expedition, suspended the Standing Orders relating to Private Bills.  
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Second, the paper discusses the empirical research involving retired judges, experienced lawyers 
and judges' clerks and the specialist essays by senior academic lawyers produced for the 50th 
anniversary conference of the Court of Appeal in 2008. The striking differences within and between 
the two lists and the particular reasons given by those participating in that research for selecting the 
cases and comparisons with cases discussed in the specialist essays bring out the real room for 
differing assessments of significance.  
Part V A highlights insights from those contributing to the history essay and reflections on some 
cases they listed- and how they saw three of the most ranked cases. The interchange at the 20th 
anniversary symposium on the New Zealand Maori Council case shows how the straightforward 
legal questions there had become invested with a much wider significance, essentially because of 
the impact of the case on Maori-Government relations and ultimately on our political history. 
Invercargill City Council v Hamlin determined major issues of great practical significance 
concerning the liability of local authorities to home owners for the carelessness of their building 
inspectors. The ramifications of the case are still of huge practical significance in the continuing 
debate over liability for leaky buildings. Hosking v Runting was a major privacy case concerning 
photographing families of celebrities out in the street. Five years on the guide posts are still far from 
settled. 
Third, the second half of the paper is designed to bring out how and why in a range of appeal 
cases we drew on what we saw as matters of significance in reaching the decision. 
The particular focus of King-Ansell was on language – determining the meaning of words in 
their context. It involved extended consideration of the processes for recording actual usages 
followed in the compilation of dictionaries and subsequent supplements.  
In Van Gorkom it was on administrative functioning, settling limits to the exercise of 
governmental power and facilitating effective administration. Social changes over the last 30 years 
would, of course, bar what seemed a sensible administrative approach in the New Zealand of the 
late 1970s to the problem of a small bureaucracy dealing over the summer with an avalanche of 
claims for removal expenses of teachers transferring on promotion.  
In DHL v Richmond it was on the economic implications of decision-making. Commercial 
parties know that the protection the contract provides is factored into the price – you get what you 
pay for. If they enter into a low-priced courier contract ($22.50 in the DHL case for conveying a 
package to Italy) that excludes liability on the part of the courier, then they are electing to bear any 
resulting losses. 
In Hadlee v Commissioner of Inland Revenue the particular focus was on statutory 
interpretation, reflecting the historical development of the statutory subject matter and the policies 
underlying related categories. We concluded that there was no justification in principle for 
differentiating between salary and wage earners and professionals whose income is the product of 
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their personal exertion. In either case the person whose personal exertion earns the income derives 
the income and pays the tax. 
In Re Simpson it was on the development of the common law of New Zealand. Instead of simply 
focussing on the ancient stance of the common law of England and its development there, we 
considered it helpful to canvass American, Canadian and Scottish material and adopted the Wigmore 
test as best calculated to advance the interests of justice in New Zealand. And, while the reported 
judgment was silent as to the ultimate destination of the property, checking confirmed that the 
Crown was persuaded to apply a statutory provision and pay the available funds to members of Mrs 
Simpson's family. 
Fleming was concerned with the duty of care in negligence. The Court rejected claims against 
the Securities Commission and two newspapers in respect of failed investments in a finance 
company made as a result of reading its newspaper advertisements. The Commission was a 
supervisory agency with a limited role and clear discretion in deciding how it went about exercising 
its functions. Rejecting the claim against the newspapers, we concluded that they were essentially 
selling space for the advertisers to promote their goods and services and the advertisements were 
only a vehicle to allow potential investors to make contact with the finance company. 
Finally, Re Macfarlane is an example, reflected elsewhere in our law, of the co-operative 
functioning of the three branches of government. While not as exciting as relishing the clash of 
possible standoffs between the Courts and the Legislature, it does represent day to day reality. 
 
